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Abstract
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a model for competition in markets where
each firm offers a schedule of prices and quantities to face demand uncertainty, and has
been successfully applied to wholesale electricity markets. However, characterizing the
SFE is difficult, both analytically and numerically. In this paper, we first present a
specialized algorithm for capacity constrained asymmetric duopoly markets with affine
costs. We show that solving the first order conditions (a system of differential equa-
tions) using spline approximations is equivalent to solving a least squares problem,
which makes the algorithm highly efficient. We also propose using splines as a way to
improve a recently introduced general algorithm, so that the equilibrium can be found
more easily and faster with less user intervention. We show asymptotic convergence
of the approximations to the true equilibria for both algorithms, and illustrate their
performance with numerical examples.
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1 Introduction
With the presence of demand uncertainty, firms may choose to compete in supply functions
– a schedule of prices and quantities that correspond to different realizations of the demand.
Such concept was first introduced by Klemperer and Meyer [1], and they named the non-
cooperative Nash Equilibrium of this type of games the Supply Function equilibrium (SFE).
Soon, people found that the competition in the deregularized wholesale electricity markets
bear high resemblance to this formulation, and Green and Newbery [2] first applied this model
to the England and Wales market. Since then, modeling behaviors of wholesale electricity
markets has been an important application of the SFE.
The SFE model has attracted tremendous attention from both industry and academia. De-
spite its popularity, people found the SFE model difficult due to the following issues: (1)
The first order necessary conditions of the SFE is a system of ordinary differential equations
(ODE), shown in Klemperer and Meyer [1], but when people try to solve this system of
ODEs, they usually find that the solutions are not increasing functions1, which is a require-
ment for feasibility; (2) there can be an infinite number of supply function equilibria, leading
to an equilibrium selection problem; (3) it is hard to incorporate capacity constraints and
general cost functions to the framework, and allowing supply functions to have a free form
makes the problem even more complicated, therefore many studies are limited to symmetric
firms and/or restraining the solution space to functions of simple forms, such as linear2 and
quadratic functions.
Despite all the difficulties, researchers have made substantial progress both in theoretical and
computational analysis of the SFE. Klemperer and Meyer [1] provided foundational analysis
of the supply function equilibrium, and compares and contrasts the SFE with the equilibria
1In this paper, the terms “increasing” and “non-decreasing” are used interchangeably. Supply functions
must be non-decreasing (increasing) to be feasible, but not necessarily strictly increasing.
2We use “linear” for first-degree polynomials, which are also called affine functions in some literature.
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of Cournot and Bertrand games. It also showed the existence of the SFE of symmetric
oligopolies (assuming convex costs, a concave demand, and no capacity constraints), and
showed that there could usually be infinite supply function equilibria, unless the support of
the distribution of the demand shock was unbounded.
Later, researchers found that capacity constraints could greatly reduce the number of poten-
tial supply function equilibria, and sometimes even make it unique. Holmberg [3] proved that
if we had symmetric producers, inelastic demand, a price cap and if the capacity constraints
bound with a positive probability, then we had a unique symmetric equilibrium. With the
same conditions, except that the producers had identical marginal costs but asymmetric
capacities, Holmberg [4] showed the equilibrium was unique and piecewise symmetric.
Perhaps the most important topic in the study of SFEs is how to find them. Finding the SFE
is difficult, and restrictions are usually needed. Rudkevich et al. [5] provided a closed-form
formula for cases where demand was inelastic and firms did not have capacity constraints, and
it further showed that the equilibrium price had a high mark-up compared to the perfectly
competitive price. Green [6, 7] restricted the supplies to linear functions, and applied the
model to the England and Wales market. Baldick et al. [8] showed how to find linear and
piecewise linear SFE when the demand and marginal costs were linear.
A popular approach to finding the SFE is to work on the first order conditions (a system of
ODEs). Many of the studies following this approach involved the use of numerical integration,
but the major difficulty was that the initial conditions were unknown, and without the right
initial conditions, the integrals so calculated would usually not be increasing functions, i.e.
they were not feasible supply functions. With the assumption that capacity constraints of
smaller firms bind earlier, Holmberg [9] provided a procedure for solving the ODE system
via numerical integration that searched for feasible solutions by tuning the initial conditions,
i.e., the prices at which the capacity constraints were reached.
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Baldick and Hogan [10] proposed an alternative approach that used an iterative scheme
for finding the SFE: At each step, each firm updates its supply function by moving to the
best response to the other firms’ previous offers with a discount factor. This procedure
was repeated and hopefully it would converge. However, as the authors pointed out, the
computational cost (finding the best response) of this iterative scheme was huge, even when
it converged.
To use the iterative scheme, one must first know how to find the optimal response to a
given set of supplies. Anderson and Philpott [11] provided conditions for the existence of
the optimal response, and analyzed the bound of difference in profit when approximations
of the supply functions were needed. Anderson and Philpott [12] and Anderson and Xu
[13] expressed the expected return of the firms as line integrals, proved the existence of
the optimal supply function, and gave necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality.
Rudkevich [14] described an algorithm for developing piecewise linear optimal responses by
cutting the x-y plane into blocks.
Baldick and Hogan [15] discussed using high degree polynomials in the iterative scheme as a
parametric form of the supply functions. The authors pointed out that such approximation
was not stable. By “stable” they meant that given a small perturbation in the equilibrium,
the supply functions would still converge to the same equilibrium if the firms followed the
iterative scheme.
Anderson and Hu [16] showed conditions for the SFEs’ continuity and differentiability, which
served as theoretical guides to algorithm development. In addition, they proposed a numer-
ical method for finding the SFE that allowed the firms to have heterogeneous capacities
and costs. Their method allowed the supply functions to have free form, and approximates
them with piecewise linear functions. To find the equilibrium, the method searched for a
feasible solution by solving an auxiliary nonlinear program (NLP) that had the necessary
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conditions as the constraints. This method has been successfully applied in Sioshansi and
Oren [17], which showed some large generators in the ERCOT electricity market in Texas
bid approximately in accordance with the SFE model.
All the above studies of supply function equilibria focused on continuous supply functions,
while in practice offers in most markets are step-functions. Holmberg et al. [18] showed
convergence of the discrete SFE to the well studied continuous one as the number of steps
increases.
In this paper we benefit from Anderson and Hu [16], and focus on numerical methods for
finding the SFE. We allow the supply functions to have free form, and we will exploit the
capability of splines to approximate the SFE accurately.
In the first part of this paper, we provide a specialized algorithm for markets of asymmetric
duopolies that have constant marginal costs. In Section 2, we express the first order con-
ditions with splines, reduce the problem of solving the system of ODEs to a least squares
problem, and show that the solution space of the ODE system and that of the least squares
problem are the same (in terms of approximation). Since we avoided using numerical inte-
gration, we do not have the initial point selection problem. The solution of the least squares
problem has a very simple form, and we show in Section 3 that we can use a linear search
to find the unique equilibrium of the capacitated problem. In Section 4, we propose an
improvement to the general method given by Anderson and Hu [16]. We will see that with
the use of splines, the number of decision variables and constraints can be greatly reduced,
thus in principle solving the optimization problem should be easier and faster. Uniform
convergence will be shown for both methods. Examples that demonstrate the use and the
properties of these methods are provided in Section 5.
5
2 Solving the First Order Necessary Conditions
Our model considers a market with m firms. Each firm i has a maximal capacity Capi. Let
Ci(q) be the cost of firm i for producing an amount of q. Assume Ci(q) is convex, non-
decreasing and differentiable for all i. Each firm knows the exact cost function and capacity
of its own, as well as those of all the other competitors.
The market demand is a function of the form D(p, ε) = D(p)+ε. D(p) is strictly decreasing,
continuously differentiable and concave, and it is known to all firms. The demand shock ε is
a continuous random variable, and all the firms know that ε has positive probability density
on [εmin, εmax]. We will focus on the type of SFE that each point of the supply function is
the best response to a realization of ε, also termed as “strong SFE” in Anderson and Hu [16],
so the knowledge of the exact distribution of ε is not necessary for finding the equilibrium.
The supply function of firm i is a non-decreasing function si : [0, pmax] → [0, Capi], where
pmax = sup{p ≥ 0 | D(p, εmax) ≥ 0}. If there is a market specified price cap and if it is less
than sup{p ≥ 0 | D(p, εmax) ≥ 0}, let pmax equal to the price cap.
As first pointed out in Klemperer and Meyer [1], in an SFE, the supply functions {sj}
m
j=1
must maximize each firm’s profit
max
p
p
[
D(p) + ε−
∑
i 6=j
si(p)
]
− Cj(D(p) + ε−
∑
i 6=j
si(p)), j = 1, . . . , m (2.1)
at all p ∈ [0, pmax]. If the supply functions {sj}
m
j=1 are differentiable at p, and if 0 < sj(p) <
Capj for all j, then we have the first order conditions
∑
i 6=j
s′i(p)−
sj(p)
p− C ′j (sj(p))
= D′(p), j = 1, . . . , m.
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Throughout Section 2 and 3, we assume that the marginal costs are constant. Let the
marginal cost for firm j be cj . Then the first order conditions reduce to
∑
i 6=j
s′i(p)−
sj(p)
p− cj
= D′(p), j = 1, . . . , m. (2.2)
Anderson and Hu [16] proves that in an equilibrium, the supply functions are continuous
for p /∈ {c1, . . . , cm}. Furthermore, it shows that in an equilibrium, each supply function
si(p) is continuously differentiable at p /∈ {c1, . . . , cm} ∪ {pCap1 , . . . , pCapm}, where pCapi
is the price where firm i reaches its capacity, i.e., pCapi = inf{p | si(p) = Capi}. As-
sume max(c1, . . . , cm) < min(pCap1, . . . , pCapm). Since the supply functions are increasing,
if 0 < si(p) < Capi is true for all i at a price p, then we must have max(c1, . . . , cm) <
p < min(pCap1 , . . . , pCapm), which implies that {si}
m
i=1 are continuously differentiable at
p. Therefore, {si}
m
i=1 is a solution to the ODE system (2.2) for all the prices p such
that max(c1, . . . , cm) < p < min(pCap1 , . . . , pCapm). Since we do not know the value of
min(pCap1, . . . , pCapm) yet, we will solve (2.2) numerically for p ∈ (pmin, pmax), where pmin =
max(c1, . . . , cm), and we will find min(pCap1, . . . , pCapm) in the next section.
Since {si(p)}
m
i=1 are continuously differentiable on (max(c1, . . . , cm),min(pCap1 , . . . , pCapm)),
it is a good idea to approximate them with splines. To achieve continuous differentiability,
the splines we use should be at least of order 3 (quadratic splines). Order 4 splines (cubic
splines) are prefered by most people, as they are the lowest-order splines that are smooth to
human eyes.
Splines have been very popular for their capability for approximation. And beginning from
the late 1960’s, splines are being used by mathematicians to develop numerical solutions
to ordinary and partial differential equations. We will fundamentally do the same in this
section. To estimate the spline coefficients, one can either use interpolation or use least
squares estimation. In this paper we use the latter one, and the reason will be justified
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shortly.
We start by selecting knots for the spline approximation, and for simplicity, we will let
the knots for all the supply functions be the same, as this is good enough according to
our numerical experience. Then, according to the type of splines we use, we will have basis
functions associated with the knots. Denote the bases with Bt(x), t = 1, . . . , K, K depending
on the type and the order of the splines. Let B(x) = (B1(x), . . . , BK(x))
T , a vector of basis
functions. Denote the spline approximation of si(p) with
sˆi(p) =
∑
t
bitBt(p) = B
T (p) · βi,
where bit are the coefficients to be determined and βi = (bi1, . . . , biK)
T is the coefficient vector
for sˆi.
We replace the supply functions in the first order conditions (2.2) with their spline approxi-
mations. The equations now become
∑
i 6=j
∑
t
bitB
′
t(p)−
∑
t bjtBt(p)
p− cj
= D′(p), j = 1, . . . , m. (2.3)
Observe that with p fixed, (2.3) is linear in bit, i = 1, . . . , m, t = 1, . . . , K. Thus (2.3) can
also be written in matrix form:
B
T
{j}(p) · β = D
′(p), j = 1, . . . , m, (2.4)
where
B{j}(p) = (B
′T (p), . . . , B′T (p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−1
,−
BT (p)
p− cj
, B′T (p), . . . , B′T (p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−j
)T ,
is a vector of functions, and
β = (βT1 , . . . , β
T
m)
T .
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The necessary conditions (2.4) are linear equations that the splines are expected to satisfy.
Hence it is natural to use the least squares method to estimate the coefficients, which is
part of the reason of our choice. At each price p, (2.4) provides m equations. We have
K · m coefficients to estimate, thus one may wish to choose at least K prices from the
range (pmin, pmax) to determine bit, i = 1, . . . , m, t = 1, . . . , K.
3 Let the selected prices be
p1, ..., pN ∈ (pmin, pmax). Let
B = (B{1}(p1), . . . ,B{m}(p1), . . . ,B{1}(pN), . . . ,B{m}(pN))
T ,
and
d = (D′(p1), . . . , D
′(p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, . . . , D′(pN), . . . , D
′(pN)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
)T .
We expect the spline approximations to satisfy the linear system Bβ = d, where a typical
line of the system, say, BT{j}(pk)β = D
′(pk), is a characterization of the relationship between
sˆj and the derivatives of all the other supply functions at price pk. To estimate {bit}, we
solve the optimization problem
min
{bit}
‖Bβ − d‖2 . (2.5)
Before we solve this minimization problem, we would like to have a look at the solution to
the original ODE system analytically.
Consider a market with two firms 1 and 2. (2.2) is now a set of two equations:
s′1(p)−
s2(p)
p− c2
= D′(p),
s′2(p)−
s1(p)
p− c1
= D′(p),
3In fact as we will see very soon, it is not enough to determine the coefficients. But to reduce confusion,
let us just proceed at this point.
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whose homogeneous problem
s′1(p)−
s2(p)
p− c2
= 0,
s′2(p)−
s1(p)
p− c1
= 0,
has solution
s1(p) = t1(p− c1) +
t2
(c1 − c2)2
(
c2 − c1 + (p− c1) log
(
p− c2
p− c1
))
,
s2(p) = t1(p− c2) +
t2
(c1 − c2)2
(
c2 − c1 + (p− c2) log
(
p− c2
p− c1
))
,
where t1, t2 ∈ R, that is, a homogeneous solution is a linear combination of two fundamental
solutions. However, if t2 6= 0, it is easy to verify that as p→ max(c1, c2) from above, either
|s1| → ∞ or |s2| → ∞. Therefore for the practical background of our problem, t2 must be
0, and consequently the homogeneous solution is just
s1(p) = t(p− c1),
s2(p) = t(p− c2). (2.6)
Thus if {s01(p), s
0
2(p)} and {s
1
1(p), s
1
2(p)} are two equilibria, we must have s
1
1(p) = s
0
1(p) +
t(p−c1), s
1
2(p) = s
0
2(p)+t(p−c2) for some t. On the other hand, if {s1(p), s2(p)} is a solution
to the ODE system (2.2), then {s1(p)+ t(p− c1), s2(p)+ t(p− c2)} is a solution, too, for any
t ∈ R. Thus (2.2) has infinite solutions, and we next show that our spline approximation
can indeed represent all these solutions in duopoly markets. This result holds unless B has
columns of zeros4 or has fewer rows than columns.
Theorem 1. For duopoly markets, B does not have full column rank. Furthermore, the
rank of B is 2K − 1, unless it contains columns of zeros or has fewer rows than columns.
4This happens when an knot interval contains no pk if we use B-splines. If we use natural cubic splines,
it happens if neither of the last two knot intervals contains any pk.
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These results do not dependent on the type of splines and the selection of knots.
Proof. Write the first order conditions in matrix form
B′T (p)β1 −
BT (p)β2
p− c2
= D′(p),
−
BT (p)β1
p− c1
+B′T (p)β2 = D
′(p).
To prove the first part of Theorem 1, it is sufficient to show that the matrix of functions

 B′T (p) −BT (p)p−c2
−B
T (p)
p−c1
B′T (p)


has linearly dependent columns. And since elementary row operations preserve rank, it is
equivalent to show that the columns of

 (c2 − p)B′T (p) BT (p)
BT (p) (c1 − p)B
′T (p)


are linearly dependent. We prove this by using the fact that the elements of B(p) form a
basis of the space S, which is composed of all the splines on (pmin, pmax) with the prescribed
order and knots.
Assume that we have a nonzero vector vT = (vT1 , v
T
2 ) such that

 (c2 − p)B′T (p) BT (p)
BT (p) (c1 − p)B
′T (p)



 v1
v2

 = 0,
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or equivalently
(c2 − p)B
′T (p)v1 +B
T (p)v2 = 0,
BT (p)v1 + (c1 − p)B
′T (p)v2 = 0.
Let f1(p) = B
T (p)v1 and f2(p) = B
T (p)v2. Thus the above can be rewritten as
(c2 − p)f
′
1(p) + f2(p) = 0,
f1(p) + (c1 − p)f
′
2(p) = 0. (2.7)
Recall that f1(p) and f2(p) are splines. Thus (2.7) implies that f1(p) and f2(p) must be linear
functions (they are single-piece linear functions because of their smoothness). Therefore, we
must have f1(p) = t(p− c1) and f2(p) = t(p− c2), where t is an arbitrary scalar.
Since f1(p) = t(p− c1) ∈ S and f2(p) = t(p− c2) ∈ S, v1 and v2 must exist and are unique.
If t 6= 0, then we have v1 6= 0 and v2 6= 0, thus we proved that B does not have full rank.
Furthermore, since t(p− c2) and t(p− c1) are the only forms that f1(p) and f2(p) can have,
it implies that the null space of B has only one dimension, i.e., the rank of B is 2K − 1.
Theorem 1 shows that when we have only two firms, the general solution to the optimization
problem “minimize ‖Bβ − d‖2” has the form β = β0 + t · v, where t ∈ R and where v is
an eigenvector of BTB whose corresponding eigenvalue is 0. In terms of individual supply
functions, the general solutions are sˆ1 = B
T (p)(β01 + tv1) = B
T (p)β01 + t(p − c1) and sˆ2 =
BT (p)(β02 + tv2) = B
T (p)β02 + t(p− c2), which have the same form as the analytical solutions,
showing that the splines are able to approximate all the solutions. This is the most important
reason why we use least squares for the estimation of the coefficients. When the market has
three or more firms, Theorem 1 no longer holds — B will generally have full rank, and
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consequently the optimal solution will be unique and does not represent the solution space
of the original ODE system.
We would also like to show the asymptotic property of this spline approximation. We will
take cubic splines as an illustration. Proofs for other types of splines are essentially the
same.
Theorem 2. If s1 and s2 are continuously differentiable on [pa, pb], where pa > max(c1, c2),
and if sˆ1 and sˆ2 are piecewise cubic splines and are solution to the least squares problem
(2.5), where we place N price levels {pk}
N
k=1 uniformly
5 among [pa, pb] and choose {τt}
K
t=1
as the knots, then as the length of the largest knot interval |τ | → 0 and N → ∞, the ODE
system (2.3) will be satisfied by sˆ1 and sˆ2, such that the error functions, sˆ
′
−i(p)−
sˆi(p)
p−ci
−D′(p),
i = 1, 2, uniformly converge to 0 on [pa, pb].
6
Proof. Since sˆ1, sˆ2 and D
′ are continuous on [pa, pb], and since pa > max(c1, c2), the sum of
squared errors ∑
i=1,2
(
sˆ′−i(p)−
sˆi(p)
p− ci
−D′(p)
)2
is Riemann integrable on [pa, pb]. We will show that the integral
ˆ pb
pa
[∑
i=1,2
(
sˆ′−i(p)−
sˆi(p)
p− ci
−D′(p)
)2]
dp→ 0,
as |τ | → 0 and N →∞.
Since (sˆ1, sˆ2) is a solution to the least squares problem, sˆ1 and sˆ2 minimize
N∑
k=1
[∑
i=1,2
(
sˆ′−i(pk)−
sˆi(pk)
pk − ci
−D′(pk)
)2]
5This is in fact unnecessary. We place the price levels this way solely for making the Riemann integral
easier to write.
6sˆi is determined by N and the knots {τt}, so it is more rigorous to write sˆi(p | N, {τt}). However, we
will proceed with sˆi for conciseness.
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among all the functions in S, the space that contains all the piecewise cubic splines with the
selected knots {τt}. Let I4s1 and I4s2 denote the complete cubic interpolation of s1 and s2
with knots {τt}.
7 Since I4s1, I4s2 ∈ S, we must have
N∑
k=1
[∑
i=1,2
(
sˆ′−i(pk)−
sˆi(pk)
pk − ci
−D′(pk)
)2]
≤
N∑
k=1
[∑
i=1,2
(
I4s
′
−i(pk)−
I4si(pk)
pk − ci
−D′(pk)
)2]
. (2.8)
There are upper bounds for the error of the complete cubic interpolations. For example,
from de Boor [19] one knows that for any g ∈ C1[a, b], we have ‖I4g − g‖∞ ≤
57
8
|τ |ω(g′, |τ |
2
)
and ‖I4g
′ − g′‖∞ ≤
57
4
ω(g′, |τ |
2
), where ‖f‖∞ = sup{|f(x)| | x ∈ [a, b]} and ω(f, h) =
sup{|f(x)− f(y)| | |x− y| < h}. So there exists a constant C, such that for any g ∈ C1[a, b],
‖I4g − g‖∞ ≤ C |τ |ω(g
′, |τ |
2
) and ‖I4g
′ − g′‖∞ ≤ Cω(g
′, |τ |
2
).
Therefore as |τ | → 0, for any p ∈ [pa, pb],
(
I4s
′
−i(p)−
I4si(p)
p− ci
−D′(p)
)2
=
(
(I4s
′
−i(p)− s
′
−i(p))−
(
I4si(p)
p− ci
−
si(p)
p− ci
)
+ s′−i(p)−
si(p)
p− ci
−D′(p)
)2
=
(
(I4s
′
−i(p)− s
′
−i(p))−
(
I4si(p)
p− ci
−
si(p)
p− ci
))2
≤C2
(
ω(s′−i,
|τ |
2
) +
|τ |ω(s′i,
|τ |
2
)
(pa − ci)
)2
→ 0, (2.9)
where the second equality is because s′−i(p) −
si(p)
p−ci
= D′(p), i = 1, 2, a necessary condition
for an SFE, and the inequality is by applying the error bounds and the triangle inequality.
Convergence is due to uniform continuity of s′i, i = 1, 2, on [pa, pb].
7Similar to sˆi, it is actually I4si(p | {τt}), but for conciseness we will use I4si.
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So by using the definition of Riemann integral, we have
0 ≤ lim
|τ |→0
ˆ pb
pa
[∑
i=1,2
(
sˆ′−i(p)−
sˆi(p)
p− ci
−D′(p)
)2]
dp
= lim
|τ |→0
lim
N→∞
[
pb − pa
N
N∑
k=1
[∑
i=1,2
(
sˆ′−i(pk)−
sˆi(pk)
pk − ci
−D′(pk)
)2]]
≤ lim
|τ |→0
lim
N→∞
[
pb − pa
N
N∑
k=1
[∑
i=1,2
(
I4s
′
−i(pk)−
I4si(pk)
pk − ci
−D′(pk)
)2]]
≤ lim
|τ |→0
lim
N→∞
pb − pa
N
N

∑
i=1,2
C2
(
ω(s′−i,
|τ |
2
) +
|τ |ω(s′i,
|τ |
2
)
(pa − ci)
)2
= lim
|τ |→0
(pb − pa)

∑
i=1,2
C2
(
ω(s′−i,
|τ |
2
) +
|τ |ω(s′i,
|τ |
2
)
(pa − ci)
)2
=0,
where the second inequality is by (2.8), and the third inequality and the convergence are by
(2.9).
The uniform convergence follows naturally as [pa, pb] is closed and the error functions sˆ
′
−i(p)−
sˆi(p)
p−ci
−D′(p), i = 1, 2, are continuous on [pa, pb].
When s1 and s2 satisfy stronger conditions, we can use tighter bounds. For instance, Hall [20]
and Hall and Meyer [21] show that if g ∈ C4[a, b], then the tightest bounds are ‖I4g − g‖∞ ≤
5
384
|τ |4 ‖g(4)‖∞ and ‖I4g
′ − g′‖∞ ≤
1
24
|τ |3 ‖g(4)‖∞.
Now we have a simple form of the spline approximations, which we know will converge to
the true solutions as the mesh of the splines becomes finer. In the next section we will take
this advantage and find the SFE with capacity constraints.
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3 SFE of Duopolies with Capacity Constraints
In Section 2 we solved the necessary conditions for duopoly markets. In this section, we still
focus on duopoly markets, and we use the solutions from Section 2 to find the SFE with
capacity constraints. SFE of more firms will be discussed in the next section.
In the following, we denote by f(x−) and f(x+) the left and right limits of f , respectively.
Similarly, we denote by f ′(x−) and f ′(x+) the left and right derivatives of f , respectively.
Same as in Section 2, we use pCapi for the price where si reaches the capacity, i.e., pCapi =
inf{p | si(p) = Capi}.
Proposition 1. In a 2-firm-SFE, assume firm 1 reaches the capacity earlier than firm 2
does, i.e., pCap1 < pCap2. Also assume that s2(pCap1) > 0. Then s1 is differentiable at pCap1,
and the derivative is 0. In other words, the supply function that reaches the capacity first
must reach it smoothly.
Proof. Since and s2(pCap1) > 0, we have max(c1, c2) < pCap1 < pCap2 (see Anderson and
Hu [16]). So there exists δ > 0, such that s1(p) is differentiable for p ∈ (pCap1 − δ, pCap1 +
δ)\{pCap1}. And when s1(p) is differentiable, the first order condition (2.2) for s2(p) can be
written as
s2(p) = (p− c2)(s
′
1(p)−D
′(p)). (3.1)
Once s1 reaches Cap1, it cannot decrease, as we require supply functions to be non-decreasing.
Thus s1(p) = Cap1 for p ≥ pCap1 , and s
′
1(p
+
Cap1
) = 0. If s1 were not smooth at pCap1 , i.e.
s′1(p
−
Cap1
) > 0, then from (3.1), we must have
s2(p
−
Cap1
) = (pCap1 − c2)(s
′
1(p
−
Cap1
)−D′(pCap1))
> (pCap1 − c2)(s
′
1(p
+
Cap1
)−D′(pCap1)) = s2(p
+
Cap1
).
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Thus s2 would be decreasing at pCap1 , and it would be disqualified as a supply function.
Therefore, we must have s′1(p
−
Cap1
) = s′1(p
+
Cap1
) = 0.
Proposition 2. Under the same assumptions of Proposition 1, if D(p) is twice differentiable,
then the derivative of s2 has a jump at pCap1, i.e., s
′
2(p
+
Cap1
) > s′2(p
−
Cap1
).
Proof. Differentiate both sides of (3.1), we have
s′2(p) = (s
′
1(p)−D
′(p)) + (p− c2)(−D
′′(p) + s′′1(p)).
Since s′′1(p
−
Cap1
) < 0, s′′1(p
+
Cap1
) = 0, and Proposition 1 shows that s′1(pCap1) = 0, the left and
right limits of s′2 must have the relationship
s′2(p
−
Cap1
) = −D′(pCap1) + (pCap1 − c2)(s
′′
1(p
−
Cap1
)−D′′(pCap1))
< −D′(pCap1) + (pCap1 − c2)(s
′′
1(p
+
Cap1
)−D′′(pCap1)) = s
′
2(p
+
Cap1
).
Propositions 1 and 2 help us understand the nature of the SFE with capacity constraints.
Proposition 1 also provides a hint on how to find the equilibrium.
Recall from Section 2 that a general solution can be written as β = β0+t ·v, where t ∈ R and
where v is the eigenvector of BTB that corresponds to the eigenvalue 0. Note that β is just a
solution to the ODE system, and BT (p) ·βi, i = 1, 2 may well be decreasing or even negative
at some part of (pmin, pmax). Our aim is to find the β, by adjusting t, such that B
T (p) ·β1 is a
nondecreasing curve, and has maximum Cap1 at a price p > pmin, which we define as pCap1 ,
and that BT (p) · β2 is nondecreasing from pmin to pCap1 with B
T (pCap1) · β2 < Cap2. (Swap
1 and 2 if necessary.) If pCap1 ≥ pmax, then the capacities are not binding. If pCap1 < pmax,
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then Cap1 is binding, and the estimated equilibrium will be
sˆ1(p) =


max(−D′(p)(p− c1), 0), p ≤ pmin;
BT (p) · β1, pmin < p ≤ pCap1 ;
Cap1, pCap1 < p < pmax;
and
sˆ2(p) =


max(−D′(p)(p− c2), 0), p ≤ pmin;
BT (p) · β2, pmin < p ≤ pCap1 ;
min(−D′(p)(p− c2), Cap2), pCap1 < p < pmax.
Monotonicity is not an issue at the lower end where p ≤ pmin = max(c1, c2). In this price
range, the firm with the higher marginal cost does not produce, and the one with the lower
marginal cost outputs at the monopolistic level. When p reaches max(c1, c2), the high cost
firm begins to produce, and (3.1) tells us that the low cost firm can only have a sudden
increase in supply at that price. Hence there is no issue with monotonicity.
In practice, finding the appropriate β = β0 + t · v is easy. By plotting the splines, we can
easily spot the trend of how the supply functions change when we adjust t, and we can
also see intuitively that in general there can be at most one SFE with capacities constraints
(sometimes an SFE just does not exist). If we are convinced that an SFE exists, we just
need to do a linear search (thanks to the 1-dimensional solution space) to find the t that
makes one of the supply curves reaches its capacity smoothly, according to Proposition 1.
Theorem 2 guarantees that in the limit situation, sˆ1 and sˆ2 are solution to the ODE system
(2.3) for p ∈ (pmin, pCap1), and by Proposition 3 in Holmber et al. [18], the sˆ1 and sˆ2 so
constructed are indeed a supply function equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If D(pmin) + εmin < 0, then there can be at most one (strong) SFE with
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capacity constraints.
Proof. The condition D(pmin) + εmin < 0 means that it is possible that the demand is
sometimes really low, and the market clearing price must be lower than pmin = max(c1, c2),
thus by its definition, an SFE has to include prices below pmin, which further means that when
p ∈ (pmin,min(pCap1 , pCap2)), the difference between two equilibria has to be t(p−c1) for s1(p)
and t(p− c2) for s2(p), for some t ∈ R, according to (2.6). Without loss of generality, assume
s1(p) reaches its capacity first, at pCap1 . Proposition 1 shows that s
′
1(pCap1) = 0. If s¯1(p) is a
supply function of firm 1 in any equilibrium, we must have s¯1(p) = s1(p)+t(p−c1) for some t.
If t was positive, then s¯1(p) would reach its capacity at a price p¯ < pCap1. Since s
′
1(p¯) ≥ 0, we
have s¯′1(p¯) = s
′
1(p¯) + t > 0, which contradicts with Proposition 1. If t was negative, then we
have s¯1(p) = s1(p)+ t(p−c1) < Cap1 for p ≤ pCap1 , and s¯
′
1(pCap1) = s
′
1(pCap1)+ t = 0+ t < 0,
which disqualifies s¯1(p) as a supply function. Therefore t has to be 0, which means s¯1 = s1,
and hence we cannot have two distinct SFE.
All we discuss in this paper are strong SFEs, which are not guaranteed to exist. However,
Anderson [22] shows that at least for duopoly markets, weak SFEs always exist, which is
beyond the discussion of this paper.
4 A General Method for Finding SFE
When the market has more than two firms, the solution to the least squares problem will be
unique. Thus the method used in Section 3 for finding the SFE with capacity constraints
will not work, and hence we need a new method. Also, we would like a method that handles
general cost functions, instead of just linear ones. But first of all, we would like to show
some conditions that an SFE must satisfy when we have more than two firms.
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4.1 Properties at the Nonsmooth Points in Multiplayer SFE
In Section 3 we saw that when we have two firms, Proposition 1 shows that the supply
function that reaches its capacity first must reach it smoothly. When we have m firms,
m > 2, for the same reason, the m-1th supply function to reach its capacity should still
reach it smoothly, but the first m− 2 supply functions do not have to.
In Anderson and Hu [16] the authors show that in an SFE, a supply curve can be discontinu-
ous only at a price where another firm begins to produce, while all the other producing firms
are at their capacities. This leads to the following consequences, which should be observed
in a good SFE approximation.
Suppose pCap1 is the price where s1 reaches its capacity Cap1, and suppose that firms 1 . . . n,
n > 2, are producing at p−Cap1 and are not bound by their capacities. Then due to continuity,
the following must hold:
1. si(pCap1) = si(p
−
Cap1
) = (pCap1 − ci)(
∑
j 6=i s
′
j(p
−
Cap1
)−D′(pCap1)), i = 1, . . . , n;
2. si(pCap1) = si(p
+
Cap1
) = (pCap1 − ci)(
∑
j 6=1,i s
′
j(p
+
Cap1
)−D′(pCap1)), i 6= 1.
And together they imply
s′1(p
−
Cap1
) =
∑
i 6=1,2
(
s′i(p
+
Cap1
)− s′i(p
−
Cap1
)
)
= · · · =
∑
i 6=1,n
(
s′i(p
+
Cap1
)− s′i(p
−
Cap1
)
)
,
which further implies
s′2(p
+
Cap1
)− s′2(p
−
Cap1
) = · · · = s′n(p
+
Cap1
)− s′n(p
−
Cap1
) =
s′1(p
−
Cap1
)
n− 2
.
It means that the rest of the curves si, i 6= 1 are not differentiable at pCap1 , and the right
limits of their derivatives minus the left limits are all equal. Graphically, in an SFE, we
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expect to see all these curves have a jump in their derivatives at this price by the same
amount.
At the lower price level, where firms begin to produce, similar things happen, but only that
it is now a decrease in the derivatives: At c1, firm 1 begins to produce. And suppose that
firms 1 . . . n, n > 2, are producing at c+1 and are not bound by their capacities. Then we
must have:
1. si(c1) = si(c
+
1 ) = (c1 − ci)(
∑
j 6=i s
′
j(c
+
1 )−D
′(c+1 )), i = 1, . . . , n;
2. si(c1) = si(c
−
1 ) = (c1 − ci)(
∑
j 6=1,i s
′
j(c
−
1 )−D
′(c−1 )), i 6= 1.
Together they imply
−s′1(c
+
1 ) =
∑
i 6=1,2
(
s′i(c
+
1 )− s
′
i(c
−
1 )
)
= · · · =
∑
i 6=1,n
(
s′i(c
+
1 )− s
′
i(c
−
1 )
)
,
which further implies
s′2(c
+
1 )− s
′
2(c
−
1 ) = · · · = s
′
n(c
+
1 )− s
′
n(c
−
1 ) = −
s′1(c
+
1 )
n− 2
.
In a graph of the SFE, the already producing firms will have a drop in their derivatives by
the same amount, whenever there is a new firm begins production.
4.2 A General Method
In this subsection we develop a general method that works for markets with arbitrary number
of players, and the cost functions are no longer assumed to be linear. Of course this general
method can work with duopolies with linear cost functions, but still the method introduced
in Sections 2 and 3 are recommended, as least squares problems are extremely easy to solve.
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In Anderson and Hu [16] the authers show how to use piecewise linear functions to approx-
imate the supply functions in an equilibrium. They list the necessary conditions that the
supply functions of an SFE must satisfy, and try to find a set of piecewise linear functions
that satisfy these conditions at selected prices. To do so, they form an auxiliary optimiza-
tion problem with the necessary conditions as constraints, and solve for a feasible solution.
However, as they report in the paper, a feasible solution is not easy to find. They need
to relax the equality and inequality constraints to the error being less than or equal to a
bound, and let the bound shrink to zero with iteration. In addition, this method requires
user intervention: sophisticated artificial constraints need to be added to help the solver find
a feasible solution, and according to the authors, some solvers were sensitive to the objective
function, i.e., under the same constraints, the solver may deem a problem infeasible with
one objective function, but could find the optimal solution when given an another objective
function. So when the problem doesn’t solve, the user doesn’t know whether it is because
the SFE doesn’t exist or it is because he/she is not using the right objective function.
Here we base on the same idea and improve by simplifying their method with the use of
splines. In fact, their piecewise linear functions could be seen as splines with free knots (the
knots were decision variables in their model), but with formal use of splines we can greatly
reduce the number of variables and constraints of the problem, which in principle makes it
easier to find a feasible solution, and faster to find the optimal solution.
If {si}
m
i=1 form an SFE, then for any firm i, and for any demand shock ε, the corresponding
market clearing price p must solve the optimization problem
max
p
Profit(p) = [D(p) + ε−
∑
j 6=i
sj(p)]p− Ci(D(p) + ε−
∑
j 6=i
sj(p))
s.t. 0 ≤ D(p) + ε−
∑
j 6=i
sj(p) ≤ Capi.
If {si}
m
i=1 are differentiable at the optimal price p, then they must satisfy the following
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Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions:
si(p) + (p− C
′
i(si(p))− λi + µi) · (D
′(p)−
∑
j 6=is
′
j(p)) = 0,∑
jsj(p) = D(p) + ε,
si(p) ≤ Capi,
si(p) ≥ 0,
λi(Capi − si(p)) = 0,
µisi(p) = 0,
λi, µi ≥ 0, (4.1)
where λi and µi are Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to the capacity and non-negativity
constraints, respectively. Replace {si}
m
i=1 with their spline approximations {sˆi}
m
i=1 in (4.1),
and assemble (4.1) for all firms and a set of demand realizations εk, k = 1, . . . , N . Assume
that {si}
m
i=1 are differentiable at the optimal prices pk = p(εk), then the KKT conditions
become:
sˆi(pk) + (pk − C
′
i(sˆi(pk))− λik + µik)(D
′(pk)−
∑
j 6=isˆ
′
j(pk)) = 0, for all i, k,∑
j sˆi(pk) = D(pk) + εk, for all k,
sˆi(pmax) ≤ Capi, for all i,
sˆi(pmin) ≥ 0, for all i,
λik(Capi − sˆi(pk)) = 0, for all i, k,
µiksˆi(pk) = 0, for all i, k,
λik, µik ≥ 0, for all i, k, (4.2)
where sˆi(pk) is expressed as sˆi(pk) = B
T (pk)βi in computation.
Under what conditions do βi , λik and µik exist that satisfy (4.2)? The answer depends on
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what splines we use and how we select knots. For example, if we use splines of order 4, and
if we set one knot at each price level, i.e., τk = pk, then we are sure there exist βi , λik
and µik that satisfy (4.2), given the SFE itself exists. In fact, conditions (4.1) are all about
{si}
m
i=1 and their first order derivatives. If we have B
T (pk)βi = si(pk) and B
′T (pk)βi = s
′
i(pk)
for all i and k, then the βi and the original λik and µik will automatically satisfy (4.2).
This is not difficult. Since τk = pk, for any i, from pk to pk+1, B
T (p)βi is a single piece
cubic polynomial. And BT (pk)βi = si(pk), B
T (pk+1)βi = si(pk+1), B
′T (pk)βi = s
′
i(pk) and
B′T (pk+1)βi = s
′
i(pk+1) place 4 constraints that will determine the polynomial. A piecewise
cubic Hermite interpolation is a spline that satisfies these constraints. (See de Boor [19].)
More generally, if we are using B-splines, for example, then a K-knot B-spline of order M
has K + M coefficients. If we consider a price range where 0 < si < Capi for all i, thus
all supply functions are smooth and all λik and µik are 0, then there is only one equality
constraint per firm per price level, i.e., the first constraint in (4.2). Therefore, if we place
only one price level between every two adjacent knots, then there exist {βi}
m
i=1 that satisfy
(4.2). However, if we have more than one price level between some adjacent knots, then a
solution that satisfies (4.2) may not exist.
As in Anderson and Hu [16], we use an auxiliary optimization problem to find a feasible
solution. The problem here is that BT (p) has no simple analytical expression, thus it can
hardly be evaluated by a solver. Fortunately, since {si} are optimal for all the values of ε,
{εk} do not have to be chosen to reflect the distribution of ε. Hence, instead of selecting
{εk} and optimizing {pk}, we can fix {pk}, and let {εk} be the decision variables. Further,
examining (4.2) closely, one would find that {εk} do not have to appear as decision variables
at all: they are simply determined by εk = B
T (pk)
∑
j βj − D(pk). If there is an εk larger
(smaller) than the upper (lower) bound of the support of ε, it means that we have chosen a
pk too large (too small) that is not needed for the supply functions.
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In addition, feasible supply functions must be non-decreasing. Thus we place the monotonic-
ity constraint sˆi(pk) ≤ sˆi(pk+1), for all i and k. However, with this new constraint, we are no
longer guaranteed to find βi , λik and µik that satisfy (4.2), i.e., there may not be a feasible
solution in the spline space, which means that we need to do relaxations. We replace the
“= 0” constraints in (4.2) with their absolute values less than or equal to ρ, where ρ ≥ 0.
The objective is simply “minimize ρ”, thus there is no need to use iteration as in [16].
The complete formulation is now as follows:
min
ρ,β,λ,µ
ρ
s.t.
∣∣∣sˆi(pk) + (pk − C ′i(sˆi(pk))− λik + µik)(D′(pk)−∑j 6=i sˆ′j(pk))∣∣∣ ≤ ρ, for all i, k,
sˆi(pk) ≤ sˆi(pk+1), for all i, k,
sˆi(pmax) ≤ Capi, for all i,
sˆi(pmin) ≥ 0, for all i,
λik(Capi − sˆi(pk)) ≤ ρ, for all i, k,
µiksˆi(pk) ≤ ρ, for all i, k,
λik, µik ≥ 0, for all i, k, (4.3)
where sˆi(pk) = B
T (pk)βi.
Ideally, we would hope that the optimal value of ρ to be 0. But in reality, it is often the
case that there is not a solution in the spline space that exactly fits all the conditions in
(4.2), thus the optimal ρ will be positive. However, due to the flexibility of splines, there
are functions in the spline space that “almost” fit (4.2), i.e., the optimal ρ will be small (See
examples in Section 5).
We now show an asymptotic property of the approximation. Let the knots be pmin = τ0 <
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τ1 < · · · < τN = pmax, and for simplicity, let the controlled prices be pk =
1
2
(τk−1 + τk),
k = 1, . . . , N . We will only show and prove the property for quadratic splines, but it can be
proved very similarly for splines of higher orders.
Theorem 3. Assume that {si}
m
i=1 form an equilibrium and are differentiable at {τk}
N
k=0
and at {pk}
N
k=1 that are defined as above.
8 Let {sˆi}
m
i=1 be the optimal solution to (4.3),
among quadratic splines, where the knots are {τk}
N
k=0 and prices are {pk}
N
k=1, then every
price p ∈ [pmin, pmax] will eventually satisfy the KKT conditions (4.1), as |τ | → 0.
Proof. We first show that the KKT conditions will eventually be satisfied at all the controlled
points, i.e., the optimal value ρ → 0, as |τ | → 0. Then we show that the KKT conditions
will be satisfied at any point p ∈ [pmin, pmax].
For every i, let s˜i be a smooth approximation of si, such that if [τk−1, τk] does not contain
a nonsmooth point of si, then s˜i(p) = si(p), for all p ∈ [τk−1, τk]; otherwise, we only require
non-decreasingness and s˜i(p) = si(p) at pk. Note that as |τ | → 0, we will not have two
adjacent intervals that both contain nonsmooth points, and each interval will contain at
most one nonsmooth point.
Let I3s˜i be the quadratic interpolation of s˜i, such that I3s˜i(pk) = s˜i(pk) = si(pk) for all k =
1, . . . , N . Thus the monotonicity constraint, the capacity constraint and the nonnegativity
constraint are automatically satisfied.
Since s˜i is smooth, we can use the property proved in Marsden [23] that for all k,
|I3s˜
′
i(pk)− s˜
′
i(pk)| ≤ 3 sup
{
|s˜′i(p)− s˜
′
i(p
′)|: such that |p− p′| ≤
|τ |
2
}
= O(|τ |).
Let µik and λik be the same as they are in (4.1), so that the complementarity constraints
8If not differentiable, choose slightly different {τk}
N
k=0 and {pk}
N
k=1. Remember that every si(p) is con-
tinuously differentiable only except at p ∈ {C′
1
(0), . . . , C ′m(0)} ∪ {pCap1 , . . . , pCapm}.
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are satisfied, and only the first constraint in (4.3) will affect the optimal value ρ.
Consider [τk−1, τk] that does not contain a nonsmooth point of si. We have s˜i(p) = si(p) for
all p ∈ [τk−1, τk]. The error of the first order condition given by I3s˜i will be:
∣∣∣I3s˜i(pk) + (pk − C ′i(I3s˜i(pk))− λik + µik)(D′(pk)−∑j 6=iI3s˜′j(pk))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣si(pk) + (pk − C ′i(si(pk)))− λik + µik)(D′(pk)−∑j 6=iI3s˜′j(pk))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣si(pk) + (pk − C ′i(si(pk)))− λik + µik)(D′(pk)−∑j 6=is′j(pk) +∑j 6=i(s′j(pk)− I3s˜′j(pk)))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(pk − C ′i(si(pk)))− λik + µik)(∑j 6=i(s′j(pk)− I3s˜′j(pk)))∣∣∣
≤(pk − C
′
i(si(pk)))− λik + µik)(
∑
j 6=i
∣∣s′j(pk)− I3s˜′j(pk)∣∣)
=(pk − C
′
i(si(pk)))− λik + µik)(
∑
j 6=i
∣∣s˜′j(pk)− I3s˜′j(pk)∣∣)
≤(pk − C
′
i(si(pk)))− λik + µik)(
∑
j 6=iO(|τ |))
=O(|τ |),
where in the first equality we replaced I3s˜i(pk) with si(pk) as they are equal, in the second
equality we added and subtracted
∑
j 6=is
′
j(pk), in the third equality we removed si(p) + (p−
C ′i(si(p))−λi+µi) ·(D
′(p)−
∑
j 6=i s
′
j(p)) as it equals 0, and in the fourth equality we replaced
s′j(pk) with s˜
′
j(pk), because by construction s˜j = sj on[τk−1, τk].
Now consider [τk−1, τk] that does contain a nonsmooth point p
∗ of si. There are 2 cases:
p∗ < pk and p
∗ > pk (We assumed pk is a differentiable point).
For the case p∗ < pk, in the next interval [τk, τk+1], for all i = 1, . . . , m, (a) si is smooth, (b)
s˜i = si, and (c) I3s˜i is a quadratic interpolation of s˜i. So we have (d) s
′
i(pk) = s
′
i(τk)+O(|τ |)
(by a), (e) I3s˜
′
i(τk) = s˜
′
i(τk) + O(|τ |) = s
′
i(τk) + O(|τ |) (by b and c), and (f) I3s˜
′
i(pk) =
I3s˜
′
i(τk) +O(|τ |) (by c). Thus by d, e and f, |s
′
i(pk)− I3s˜
′
i(pk)| = O(τ), for all i.
Similarly, in the case p∗ > pk, we look at the previous interval. So for all i, s
′
i(pk) = s
′
i(τk−1)+
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O(|τ |), I3s˜
′
i(τk−1) = s˜
′
i(τk−1) +O(|τ |) = s
′
i(τk−1) +O(|τ |), and I3s˜
′
i(pk) = I3s˜
′
i(τk−1) +O(|τ |),
thus |s′i(pk)− I3s˜
′
i(pk)| = O(τ).
Therefore, the error of the first order condition given by I3s˜i will be:
∣∣∣I3s˜i(pk) + (pk − C ′i(sˆi(pk))− λik + µik)(D′(pk)−∑j 6=iI3s˜′j(pk))∣∣∣
≤(pk − C
′
i(si(pk)))− λik + µik)(
∑
j 6=i
∣∣s′j(pk)− I3s˜′j(pk)∣∣)
≤(pk − C
′
i(si(pk)))− λik + µik)(
∑
j 6=iO(|τ |))
=O(|τ |).
Thus we can conclude that the best ρ with {I3s˜i}
m
i=1 is O(|τ |). And since {I3s˜i}
m
i=1 is just
one of the feasible approximations, the optimal value ρ for (4.3) must be at least as good as
O(|τ |). Therefore ρ→ 0, as |τ | → 0.
The uniform convergence follows naturally due to uniform continuity: Let λˆi(p) and µˆi(p),
i = 1, . . . , m, be linear interpolations of {λik} and {µik} (so they are non-negative), i.e.,
λˆi(p) =


λik, p = pk;
pk−p
pk−pk−1
λi,k−1 +
p−pk−1
pk−pk−1
λik, pk−1 < p < pk,
and
µˆi(p) =


µik, p = pk;
pk−p
pk−pk−1
µi,k−1 +
p−pk−1
pk−pk−1
µik, pk−1 < p < pk.
So the approximated supply functions {sˆi(p)}, and the Lagrangians {λˆi(p)} and {µˆi(p)} are
uniformly continuous on [pmin, pmax]. Also, the error functions of the first order conditions
FOCi(p) = sˆi(p) + (p− C
′
i(sˆi(p))− λˆi(p) + µˆi(p))(D
′(p)−
∑
j 6=i
sˆ′j(p)), i = 1, . . . , m
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and the error functions of the complementarity conditions
LAMi(p) = λˆi(p)(Capi − sˆi(p)), i = 1, . . . , m
and
MUi(p) = µˆi(p)sˆi(p), i = 1, . . . , m
are uniform continuous.
For any p ∈ [pmin, pmax], let pk¯ be the nearest point to p among {pk}. Hence, for any ǫ > 0, as
proved above, there exists δ1 > 0, such that when |τ | < δ1, for all i, we have |FOCi(pk¯)| <
ǫ
2
,
|LAMi(pk¯)| <
ǫ
2
and |MUi(pk¯)| <
ǫ
2
. Convergence at all {pk} are dominated by ρ, so δ1
is independent of pk¯. By construction, 0 ≤ sˆi(pk¯) ≤ Capi. Also, there exists δ2 > 0, such
that when |p¯− p˜| < δ2, due to uniform continuity, we have |FOCi(p¯)− FOCi(p˜)| <
ǫ
2
,
|LAMi(p¯)− LAMi(p˜)| <
ǫ
2
, |MUi(p¯)−MUi(p˜)| <
ǫ
2
and |sˆi(p¯)− sˆi(p˜)| < ǫ. Thus, for
|τ | < min(δ1, δ2), we must have |FOCi(p)| < ǫ, |LAMi(p)| < ǫ, |MUi(p)| < ǫ and −ǫ ≤
sˆi(pk¯) ≤ Capi + ǫ. Therefore, the KKT conditions will eventually be satisfied uniformly at
all p ∈ [pmin, pmax], as |τ | → 0.
The first constraint in (4.3) from the KKT conditions is just what the ODE system (2.2)
says, thus Proposition 3 in [18] and Theorem 3 together guarantee that in the limit situation
the solution of (4.3) is a supply function equilibrium (when it exists).
In case the solution gets stuck at a local minimum, one can try replacing the constraint
sˆi(pk) ≤ sˆi(pk+1) with bi,t ≤ bi,t+1, if one uses B-splines. The constraint bi,t ≤ bi,t+1 is a
sufficient condition for non-decreasingness for B-splines, so using it instead of the necessary
condition sˆi(pk) ≤ sˆi(pk+1) will reduce the space of feasible solutions, thus making the
solution less likely to fall into local minima. Also, one does not want to over reduce the
space, so quadratic splines are recommended, because bi,t ≤ bi,t+1 is a necessary and sufficient
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condition for quadratic splines to be non-decreasing. In addition, our experience shows that
although the optimal ρ given by the pointwise monotonicity constraint sˆi(pk) ≤ sˆi(pk+1) is
usually smaller than that from the full monotonicity constraint bi,t ≤ bi,t+1, the solution from
the latter formulation is usually more robust than the former (See Example 3). Thus it is
always good to consider using the full monotonicity constraint, even when local minimum is
not present.
We see that compared to the formulation given in Anderson and Hu (see [16] (14), (17) and
(18)), formulation (4.3) has significantly less variables and constraints, so in principle it is
easier to find a feasible solution and faster to solve. It is also user friendlier, as it does not
require the user to adjust the objective function and constraints when solving a problem.
Since there is no description in [16] about in which cases it is hard to find feasible solutions,
we are unable to make a comparison, but we have not experienced any difficulty in the many
problems we tested.
When solving the problem we selected finite {pk}. If the firms were able to choose p contin-
uously, they may be able to improve the profit slightly. The improvement of firm i’s profit
at pk can be approximated by |Profit
′(pk) · (p− pk)|+O(|τ |
2). If λik = 0 and µik = 0, then
|Profit′(pk) · (p− pk)| < ρ |τ | = O(|τ |
2). So the improvement shrinks to 0 as |τ | → 0.
5 Numerical Examples
The following are a few examples demonstrating the use of the numerical methods we intro-
duced above. Without loss of generality, constant terms of all the cost functions are set to
0, as they do not affect the results. When solving problems with the general method, both
IPOPT [24] and CONOPT [25] are good choices for the solver. With their default settings,
CONOPT tends to give a slightly better solution in terms of optimality and feasibility, while
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IPOPT is much faster.
Example 1. In this example we use the least squares method to find the equilibrium in
a duopoly market. The two firms have linear cost functions: C1(q) = 10q, C2(q) = 15q.
Their capacities are Cap1 = 80 and Cap2 = 75, respectively. The demand function is
D(p) = −3p+ ε.
We use natural cubic splines in the example, while B-splines work fine, too. The knots are
from 5 to 77 at step 9. The price levels used for fitting the first order condition (2.2) are
from 16 to 65 at step 0.5. As described by Theorem 1, the B matrix has 18 columns but the
rank is 17, giving us one degree of freedom, which covers all the potential solutions when
εmin is low enough. Figure 5.1a plots the solutions to (2.2) with different values of t.
From Figure 5.1a it is easy to tell that Firm 1 will reach the capacity first. A linear search
gives that the maximum of sˆ1 will equal to Cap1 (at pCap1 = 31.65) when t = 194.06.
Therefore, the obtained splines with t = 194.06 gives an approximation of the SFE for
15 < p < pCap1 . When p ≥ pCap1 , s1(p) = 80 and s2(p) = 3(p − 15) until s2 reaches Cap2
at p = 40. When 10 ≤ p ≤ 15, s1(p) = 3(p − 10) and s2(p) = 0. Figure 5.1b shows the
approximated SFE for 10 ≤ p ≤ 45.
Example 2. This time we find the SFE in Example 1 with the general method. All the
splines we use with the general method are B-splines. For this example, the knots are from
5 to 48 at step 0.05, and we put one price level at the center of each knot interval.
We solved (4.3) with IPOPT using the full monotonicity constraint, and obtained the optimal
value ρ = 0.0048, which is sufficiently close to 0. Figure 5.2 shows the spline approximation
of the SFE. We see that when the mesh is fine enough, splines are quite capable at handling
nonsmoothness and even discontinuities of the functions.
Comparing Figure 5.2 with Figure 5.1b, we see that both methods are able to find the equi-
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Figure 5.1: Least squares approximation
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Figure 5.2: General method approximation
librium for markets of asymmetric duopoly with constant marginal costs, and the solutions
are both of high precision. However, no matter in terms of the computational time, or in
terms of the tools, solving a least squares problem is far easier than solving a highly nonlin-
ear large scale optimization problem. Thus for this type of problems, the specialized least
squares method is certainly more preferable.
Example 3. In this example we compare the effects of the two monotonicity constraints,
and the results with different mesh sizes. The example is taken from Anderson and Hu
[16], which has three firms with cost functions C1(q) = 5q + 0.8q
2, C2(q) = 8q + 1.2q
2 and
C3(q) = 12q + 2.3q
2, and capacities Cap1 = 11, Cap2 = 8 and Cap3 = 55, respectively. The
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of monotonicity constraints
demand function is D(p) = −0.5p+ ε.
First we compare the pointwise monotonicity with the full monotonicity constraints. The
knots we use are from 5 to 54 at step 0.5, and we put a price level at the center of each
knot interval. We solve the problem with CONOPT: The optimal value of ρ is 1.6 × 10−10
if we use the pointwise constraint, and it is 0.002 if we use the full constraint. Although
the pointwise constraint gives a smaller ρ, it does not necessarily mean that it is the better
choice. Figure 5.3 is a comparison of the results at the low price level, where images are
magnified. Theoretically, we know that when 5 ≤ p < 8, Firm 1 is the monopoly, thus
s1(p) =
5
18
(p − 5), and we also know that s1 should have a jump at p = 8. We see that
the solution given by the full constraint (5.3b) is closer to the true s1 than the solution
given by the pointwise constraint (5.3a) is. Therefore, despite a larger value of ρ, the full
monotonicity constraint is in fact more robust.
We also see from Figure 5.3 that although the full monotonicity constraint gives a better
approximation, it is still not close enough to the true equilibrium. This is due to the fineness
of the mesh, and as we make the mesh finer, the result will be better. As an illustration,
we reduce the knot interval from 0.5 to 0.1, and again put one price level at the center
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of each new knot interval. Keep the full monotonicity constraint and solve the problem,
CONOPT gives a new result with ρ = 0.00017. Figure 5.4 compares the result of the finer
approximation (5.4b) with the previous coarser approximation (5.4a). It is apparent that
the precision has significantly improved. Figure 5.5 is the full plot of the finer approximation
for 5 ≤ p ≤ 54.
For an even better approximation, one can always make the knot intervals smaller. However,
as the number of knots increases, the problem will eventually become too large to solve.
One way to improve the precision while keeping the problem size tractable is to use the
information we obtained from a coarser approximation. From Figure 5.5 we can see that
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for 15 ≤ p ≤ 40, the supply functions are very smooth with little fluctuation, which means
that a few pieces of quadratic polynomials are good enough to approximate them. Therefore
we can, for example, set one knot at every 0.05 unit for 5 ≤ p ≤ 15, and at every 5 units
for 15 ≤ p ≤ 40, which allows us to save hundreds of knots that would incur thousands of
constraints.
6 Conclusions
One of the reasons why finding SFE has been so difficult is that the supply functions do
not have specific forms, so all the non-decreasing functions (bounded by capacity) have to
be considered. To find these free-form functions, parameterization is almost inevitable, and
splines, due to their flexibility, are arguably the best way of parameterization for the purpose
of approximation. For duopolies with constant marginal costs, we found that the first order
conditions are linear in the spline coefficients, allowing us to approximate the solutions of the
ODE system by solving a least squares problem. We proved that when the demand can be
sufficiently low with a positive probability, the solution space of the least squares problem is
exactly the solution space of the ODE system. And since least squares problems are so easy
to solve, we can obtain solutions of high precision by using very fine mesh, while still solving
it fast. The solutions have a clean form, which allows us to find the equilibrium easily by
searching for the supply functions that reach the capacities smoothly.
We also used splines to improve the general purpose method given in Anderson and Hu
[16]. Both their original method and our proposal should be equally accurate, but the use
of splines enabled us to significantly reduce the number of decision variables and constraints
used in the auxiliary NLP, thus making the problem easier to solve, and without the need
of human intervention.
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The solutions of both the specialized and the general purpose methods are proved to converge
uniformly to the SFE. We also provided numerical examples to demonstrate the use of these
methods, and the solutions are precise and reflect the theoretical properties of SFEs that we
developed throughout the paper.
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